To make any policy work better in an expected way, it is very important to have a specified and well-structured design then only one can expect a success rate. However, when it comes to farmers’ bills and their design and the poor role of Farmers Producer Organisation (FPO), a collective approach is required.
When the concept of FPO was introduced, the makers forgot to clarify certain terms and reliability and what it actually explains. for example flaw within the farmer’s Act and FPOs is that basic aspects of contract farming like acreage, quantity, and time of delivery aren’t specified which is mandatory for any law regulating it as these constitute the building blocks of the activity that’s being legislated. the govt advertisement claims that farmer can withdraw from contract arrangement anytime without incurring any penalties. this is often again not true and can’t be an element of the arrangement if contract farming should succeed.
The Act also leaves out many sophisticated aspects of contemporary contract farming practice like contract cancellation clauses, delayed deliveries or purchase, and damages therein, and ‘tournaments’ in contract farming where farmers are made to compete with one another and paid as per relative performance which is banned in many countries.
Having asserted that APMCs were inefficient in price discovery, going back to the identical mandis raises apprehensions.
It is rather unfortunate that the Act links bonus or premium price under contact arrangement over and above the guaranteed or pre-agreed price with APMC mandi price or electronic value which must be a part of the contract agreement. This approach is anti-contract farming in nature. the worth like many other basic aspects of contract should be left to the parties to barter and can’t be tied to the other channel especially APMC price as this is able to defeat the stated rationale for bringing during this law, which was to supply alternative channels to farmers and make competition for APMC markets.
Starting off by asserting that these APMCs were inefficient in price discovery, going back to the identical mandi not only speaks ill of the Act but could also raise apprehensions over the important intent that propelled these laws.
The guidelines also allow sharecroppers to be made a celebrate the contract and be held to blame for receiving and utilizing the inputs in addition. this can be very surprising, as a contract farming agreement is mostly between either a landowner or a lessee in concert party and therefore the contracting agency because the other, and not both. the rules also mention that contract agreement should be nearly as good as any contract under the Contract Act.
If the contract farming agreement has been kept outside the ambit of the civil courts, then whats the point of giving such guidelines? It shows an absence of clarity of the assorted provisions of the Act and raises questions on rationale behind them.
Like the FPTC Act (Farmers Produce Trade And Commerce), within the Contract Farming Act too, categorizing and FPO as a farmer isn’t proper. Considering the FPOs, there are many FPOs in India which are undertaking contract farming directly or indirectly with their members and non-member farmers alike in seed production which leads to therefore, clubbing them with the farmers in not correct. they’re more of buyers and suppliers, instead of producers.
That the Act goes all the thanks to facilitate contract farming is evident from the very fact that it mentions that the stock limits Act (ECA- Essential Commodities Act) wouldn’t apply to contract farmed produce. Why should this provision of another Act be specifically mentioned in another law which has nothing to try and do with this law directly or indirectly? More importantly, the aspects of farmer empowerment and protection mentioned within the title of the Act are given a glide by in its contents.